![]() military technology from the late 1970s onward. Other contributors to the debate on unipolarity have either pointed to the relative inferiority of Chinese military technology without providing a theoretical explanation, or they have argued that developing the military capabilities to challenge the status quo is, in the long run, a function of political will-an argument that cannot account for the failure of the Soviet Union to cope with U.S. ![]() know-how in advanced weapon systems has not already diffused to other states. ![]() 6 This literature, however, cannot explain why in the age of globalization and instant communications-with cyber espionage permitting the theft of massive amount of digital data-U.S. Some scholars have argued that developing modern weapon systems has become dramatically more demanding, which in turn has made internal balancing against the United States more difficult. superiority in military technology remains largely unrivaled almost thirty years after the end of the Cold War, despite globalization and the information and communication technology revolution. Second, we develop the first systematic theoretical explanation of why U.S. F-22/A Raptor jet fighter, despite several facilitating conditions. We employ two case studies to test this argument: Imperial Germany's rapid success in closing the technological gap with the British Dreadnought battleship, despite significant inhibiting factors and China's struggle to imitate the U.S. As a result, the advantage of backwardness has shrunk significantly, and know-how and experience in the production of advanced weapon systems have become an important source of power for those who master them. On the other hand, the knowledge to design, develop, and produce advanced weapon systems is less likely to diffuse, given its increasingly tacit and organizational nature. On the one hand, the increase in complexity has significantly raised the entry barriers for the production of advanced weapon systems: countries must now possess an extremely advanced industrial, scientific, and technological base in weapons production before they can copy foreign military technology. We argue that this increase in complexity has promoted a change in the system of production that has made the imitation and replication of the performance of state-of-the-art weapon systems harder-so much so as to offset the diffusing effects of globalization and advances in communications. ![]() The international relations literature largely ignores one of the most important changes to have occurred in the realm of weapons development since the second industrial revolution (1870–1914): the exponential increase in the complexity of military technology. stealth fighters supports these findings. An examination of the British-German naval rivalry (1890–1915) and China's efforts to imitate U.S. This increase in complexity has promoted a change in the system of production that has made the imitation and replication of the performance of state-of-the-art weapon systems harder-so much so as to offset the diffusing effects of globalization and advances in communications. In particular, it largely ignores one of the most important changes to have occurred in the realm of weapons development since the second industrial revolution: the exponential increase in the complexity of military technology. This literature is built on shaky theoretical foundations, however, and its claims lack empirical support. More recent works maintain that globalization, the emergence of dual-use components, and advances in communications have facilitated this process. Can countries easily imitate the United States' advanced weapon systems and thus erode its military-technological superiority? Scholarship in international relations theory generally assumes that rising states benefit from the “advantage of backwardness.” That is, by free riding on the research and technology of the most advanced countries, less developed states can allegedly close the military-technological gap with their rivals relatively easily and quickly.
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